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Abstract: In February 1938, the police arrested Raymond Marien, a 
small, bookish man, for forging checks at Interstate Hosiery Mills, 
Inc. During the ensuing investigation, the New York Attorney Gen-
eral’s office found that Marien had “juggled” the books of the cor-
poration and that these accounting irregularities inflated Interstate 
Hosiery Mills’ assets by $1.9 million or about 40% of the company’s 
assets. In an irony of history, the company’s external auditors, as it 
turned out, employed Marien. The extensive investigation conducted 
by the SEC into Marien’s manipulations found that, save for forged 
checks amounting to about $2,000, Marien and others were exoner-
ated from any financial gain in the fraud due to the increased value 
in Interstate’s shares. In the end, the fraud and the SEC rulings would 
serve as a foundation of many modern accounting and auditing prin-
ciples related to auditor independence, supervision, and management 
responsibility. 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountant’s 
(AICPA) [2009] trial-board proceedings from March 2009 re-
ported that the Institute disciplined a CPA from New York under 
rule 101 of the Code of Conduct. According to the complaint, 
“The auditor created journal entries, coded deposits, and dis-
bursements for reporting in the general ledger without obtaining 
client approval. As a result, the auditor audited his own work.” 
This was a classic case of a lack of independence on the part 
of an auditor. The AICPA suspended the member and required 
him to complete 50 hours of continuing professional education 
and submit to a peer review. The AICPA’s decision highlights the 
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importance placed on the concept of independent audits, with 
the genesis of rules that can be traced to a 1938 Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) ruling that dealt with Interstate 
Hosiery Mills, Inc. (IHM) and Raymond Marien, an employee of 
the firm’s independent auditors.
The following paper details the story of Raymond Marien’s 
fraud at IHM. As the evidence will show, the exact amount of 
the fraud or the methods followed to accomplish it were never 
pinpointed definitively. Thus, the paper will present the balances 
from various sources to give as complete a picture as possible 
of the financial events that led up to the SEC’s report and ruling 
even though the numbers may not directly reconcile. The mate-
rials used as evidence in the paper come from SEC case reports; 
contemporary newspapers, magazine, and journal articles; as 
well as later Accounting Series Releases (ASRs) that quoted and 
used the ruling. In addition, the paper includes a brief history of 
the company; a discussion of the dual investigations by the New 
York attorney general and the SEC into the alleged account-
ing irregularities; and the life of Raymond Marien, the primary 
character. Finally, the resultant 1939 SEC ruling is explored as 
it relates to the development and application of modern auditing 
standards related to supervision, independence, and manage-
ment responsibility.1
THE ORGANIZATION OF IHM
According to the New York Times (NYT) [1929a, p. 47], 
IHM was organized as a Delaware corporation. Its purpose was 
to acquire the stock of several competing hosiery companies 
and consolidate mill operations. These companies included 
the Brilliant Silk Hosiery Company of Bloomfield, New Jersey; 
the Finery Silk Hosiery Company in Clifton, New Jersey; and 
the Lansdale Silk Hosiery Company in Lansdale, Pennsylvania 
just north of Philadelphia. The new company named Selig, the 
former sales manager of the Gotham Silk Hosiery Company, as 
the chief operating officer of the new concern, with several man-
agers from the consolidated companies named in supporting 
positions. The NYT [1929c, p. 42] published a stock prospectus 
for the new company that noted the financials were examined 
1 Two 1939 editorials evidenced the importance of the SEC ruling. The first, 
written by Carey [1939] in the Journal of Accountancy, will be discussed later in 
the paper. The second in The Texas Accountant [1939, p. 8] commented that the 
“case is of sufficient importance to justify thorough study of the Commission’s 
release.” 
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by “Messers Haskins and Sells.” The article also mentioned that 
the consolidation of the three mills would “...result in the forma-
tion of a company equipped to serve the trade with an unusually 
wide variety of merchandise distributed through varied chan-
nels producing a complete line covering a wide range in price of 
woman’s plain and fancy full fashioned silk hosiery.”
IHM completed the consolidation through the exchange 
of 110,000 shares of its stock for the shares of the three pred-
e cessor companies. Another article in the NYT [1929b, p. 40] 
reported pro-forma 1928 income for the combined company at 
an estimated $386,000 or about $3.51 per share on $4.1 million 
in sales. The company also reported that there was no funded 
(long-term bonds) debt or preferred stock, but it did have 
$159,000 in mortgages outstanding on properties with an ap-
praised value in excess of $1.78 million.
A few days after the merger, the second NYT [1929b] article 
reported that the investment banking firms of Ernst and Co. and 
Strupp and Co. took the newly consolidated company “public” 
and asked for trading privileges on the New York Curb Market. 
This request came with the issuance of 78,500 shares of newly 
issued, no-par IHM common stock with a prospectus price of 
$30.00 per share. The prospectus indicated that the purpose of 
the $2.5 million offering was for “the immediate expansion…
inasmuch as two companies have been operating day and night 
shifts and one company has been under the necessity of pur-
chasing annually from outside sources several hundred thou-
sand dollars of merchandise.…Substantial savings are expected 
through the consolidation of dyeing, finishing, and shipping 
departments.” 
To sweeten the deal, the prospectus also announced that the 
Board of Directors had declared an initial 45¢ per share divi-
dend for June 29, 1929. While the newly formed company set-
tled in their new location on the thirteenth floor of 232 Madison 
Avenue, the Curb Market admitted IHM for trading on March 7, 
1929. IHM was now in operation, but it would soon face Black 
Tuesday (October 24, 1929) and the Great Depression.
For the next four years, the company would struggle 
through the depression reporting decreases in prices of hosiery 
several times as demand waned. There was an eventual reduc-
tion of the dividend rate in 1930 from 45¢ to 35¢ per share to 
conserve cash [NYT, 1930a, p. 47]. In addition, the NYT [1930b, 
p. 39] listed several of IHM’s judgments against customers that 
had a problem paying their bills. To stabilize sales, the com-
pany, along with other hosiery manufacturers, created an in-
3
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dustry financing company to help its customers stay in business 
especially around the holidays in 1930 [NYT, 1930c, p. 49]. The 
company would not show an economic turn-around until mid-
1932. In that year, the company posted profits of 82¢ per share 
after showing moderate losses the previous two years [NYT, 
1934a, p. 34]. Prices of finished hosiery began to rise in 1933 at 
about the same time DuPont introduced rayon, a stronger syn-
thetic thread, to America’s textile manufacturers [NYT, 1933, p. 
20]. During 1934, the company complied with the new registra-
tion requirements for publicly held companies under the 1933 
Securities Act, putting it under federal regulation that included 
the proper disclosure of its financial condition [NYT, 1934b, p. 
33]. The IHM came out of the depression with a strong income 
report in February 1934 of $462,000 or $4.81 per share [NYT, 
1934a, p. 34]. In the end, the company would survive the worst 
economic downturn in U.S. history only to confront a more 
daunting set of problems in early 1938.
DISCOVERY OF ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES
Troubles at the New York Curb Market: According to the Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ) [1938a], on February 15, 1938, the officials 
of the IHM arrived at their offices on Madison Avenue in New 
York like any other day. The company was in its tenth year. Dur-
ing the day, the New York Curb Market2 informed the company 
that it was about to suspend the trading of IHM’s stock after 
the company itself reported that several accounting irregulari-
ties had been found in its yet to be released 1937 annual report. 
These irregularities included the wanton falsification of the com-
pany’s annual reports for the published years 1934 through 1936 
and the unreleased year of 1937. The irony of the situation was 
that none of the company’s officials were accused of this fraud. 
Rather, the accused was Marien, an employee of the company’s 
auditors, Homes & Davis (H&D). The story became a minor 
sensation in the newspapers of New York City until the more 
salacious and deadly revelations about McKesson-Robbins3 
pushed it to the back pages a few months later. Felker [2003, p. 
45] pointed out that the actions of the people in the IHM case 
“reflect the origins [of the SEC’s] longstanding views on the role 
2 The New York Curb Exchange was the former name of the American Stock 
Exchange.
3 McKesson & Robbins was a New York drug manufacturer whose manage-
ment defrauded stockholders through the “manufacture” of false accounting doc-
uments that were not properly reviewed by its outside auditor, Price Waterhouse. 
4
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of and responsibilities of executives and auditors.” Felker fur-
ther commented that the IHM case thrust the principles of audi-
tor independence, supervision, and management responsibility 
to the forefront of the profession and fundamentally changed 
the philosophy of auditing in much the same way that the more 
famous 1938 McKesson & Robbins case changed the way audits 
were conducted.
Homes & Davis CPAs: The NYT [1939b, p. 37] reported that 
Henry Homes and Morton Davis founded the CPA firm H&D 
in 1917. The firm’s offices were on Fifth Avenue, not far from 
IHM’s corporate offices. IHM originally retained H&D as its 
auditors in 1928 to prepare pro-forma financials used in the 
upcoming March 1929 prospectus. H&D was probably selected 
because of the firm’s previous connection to one of its subsidiar-
ies, Finery Silk Hosiery. In addition, the firm had a reputation 
as experts in the field of textile and apparel industry accounting 
[NYT, 1923, p. E10]. At the time of its association with IHM, 
there were about 90 employees, including Marien, working for 
the CPA firm.
Raymond Marien: McCarten [1962, p. 443] mentioned that 
Marien began employment at H&D circa 1928. He was de-
scribed as a “slight, clerkish man in his late thirties [with] 
intelligent eyes magnified by rimless glasses.” The NYT [1938b, 
p. 8] reported that he neither drank nor smoked, giving the im-
pression “of conservatism and utter reliability.” The SEC Report 
[1939, p. 711], regarding this incident, mentioned that Marien 
had interviewed for the job at H&D in May 1928. This was in 
response to an advertisement in the NYT. Marien informed the 
firm that he was a graduate of the University of Montreal4 and 
had eight years of “public accounting experience, including 
industrial, mercantile, banking and brokerage assignments.” He 
then reportedly told the CPA firm that he had been working for 
F.A. Bergeman, a local New York bookkeeping firm, from 1920 
to 1928. H&D sent a request to Bergeman and received a letter 
of reference from that company indicating that Marien was “a 
thoroughly competent senior accountant.” It highly recommend-
ed him for his “keen analytical ability, sound mental training, 
his tact, his loyalty and the thoroughness of his work.” H&D ap-
4 According to McCarten [1962, p. 444], Marien entered the University of 
Montreal at age 14 and worked for the Canadian Ordinance Bureau during World 
War I.
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peared to have completed its “due diligence” and hired Marien 
“without further investigation.”
As it turned out, the letter from Bergeman must have been a 
forgery. McCarten [1962, p. 449] reported that Marien had actu-
ally been working as an auditor for Price Waterhouse and Com-
pany on the D’Orsay (a New York perfume importer) account 
during the time he reportedly was working for Bergeman. This 
is the first of many contradictory stories in the press about this 
case. Earlier in the decade, the NYT [1925, p. 23], reported that 
the Paris police had arrested one Erasmus Raymond Marien 
after he had jumped bail on a charge of stealing $16,000 from 
D’Orsay, Inc. The article implied that Marien had worked for the 
New York office of D’Orsay and had looted the local checking 
account before leaving for Paris. In fact, Marien was an audi-
tor for D’Orsay’s CPA firm, Price Waterhouse. After his arrest 
in Paris and extradition to the U.S., Marien apparently plead 
guilty to the theft charges. The NYT [1938b, p. 8] reported that 
the court convicted Marien on the outstanding indictments and 
that he was sentenced to an “indeterminate period in jail not to 
exceed three years.” McCarten surmised that Marien’s relatively 
light sentence in this instance was the result of his explanation 
to the judge that he had used the money to feed his family and 
not on “dissipations.” It is very difficult to say without the ac-
tual records, but Marien may have stayed in the “Tombs” 
5
 for 
about a year and a half, and probably was released from jail sev-
eral months before he interviewed for the job at H&D. McCarten 
suggests that the New York City parole officials immediately lost 
track of Marien as he promptly reinvented himself by working at 
odd jobs and by making a minor change from his given name of 
Erasmus Raymond to simply Raymond.
From the available reports, it is difficult to say when H&D 
sent Marien to IHM’s Lansdale, Pennsylvania mill, but in March 
1930, the CPA firm named Marien the senior auditor at that 
location after a staff resignation.6 One very confusing question 
arises with this near-permanent job appointment. Why did H&D 
send an employee from the New York office to Lansdale, about 
120 miles from his home, when the position could have been 
staffed out of the firm’s Philadelphia office which had opened 
about four years prior to Marien’s employment [NYT, 1924, p. 
40]? Marien’s own penchant for lying could have been the basis 
5 The “Tombs” is the colloquial name for Manhattan’s central holding jail.
6 The SEC Report [1939, p. 712] hinted that Marien was the accountant in 
charge of the first audit of IHM in June 1929.
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for this decision. During the SEC hearings, Marien’s supervi-
sor, Theodore Phillips (the person who had hired him), testified 
that his employee seemed to have had a better knowledge of the 
silk and hosiery business than he did. As it turned out, Phillips 
would endure most of the criticism faced by the CPA firm for 
his lack of supervision over Marien. Even as Marien’s misdeeds 
became known, Phillips later testified that “he was the best ac-
countant he ever had…industrious conscientious and glutton for 
work” [WSJ, 1938e, p. 36], but he also admitted the Marien acted 
both as the senior accountant on the job and the supervisor “so 
his falsifications escaped unnoticed” [NYT, 1938h, p. 23].
After Marien’s first year in-charge of the Lansdale audit, 
IHM’s officials asked H&D if he could supervise the bookkeeping 
staff there since the company had no controller at that location. 
This fact, coupled with an unbridled confidence in Marien’s abil-
ity and veracity, was the beginning of a long string of problems. 
McCarten [1962, p. 445] comments that the company eventu-
ally entrusted him with “complete control over all its account-
ing matters” at the plant. By 1934, except for the mill’s cost 
accountant, Marien was the sole contact between the plant and 
the corporate offices in New York, going so far as to “certify” the 
materials that he personally had reviewed as the supervisor of 
the bookkeeping staff. Nobody at this point seemed to question 
this apparent conflict of interest or foresee any future difficul-
ties with auditor independence. While Marien diligently went 
about his duties between 1934 and 1938, IHM’s stock price grew 
nearly six-fold from $7.00 to $42.00 per share [NYT, 1938b, p. 8]. 
McCarten [1962, p. 445] wryly noted, “...in back of this bustling 
prosperity stood the inspired accounting of Marien.”7
 The end for Marien, aged 45, came rapidly in February 
1938 when Harold Greenwald, IHM’s corporate secretary, 
received a note from its bank in Lansdale informing him that 
his request to forward certain cancelled checks to Mr. Marien 
could not be honored because a clerk had already dispatched 
that month’s bank statements to the company. This mistake by 
the bank’s clerk turned out to be quite serendipitous. Greenwald 
quickly realized that he had a problem because he knew that 
he had never sent such a request to the bank. Upon investiga-
tion, he found the two checks, totaling $800, had been forged 
by Raymond Marien, their trusted accountant. After confessing 
7 The NYT [1938c, p. 29] reported that New York investment journalist Leo 
Bercow was “fired by enthusiasm” to recommend IHM’s stock based on the com-
pany’s falsified cash position. 
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his forgery, H&D officials fired Marien, but in a strange turn of 
events, IHM’s officials asked that he remain in his position to 
complete the annual report from the Lansdale mill that the com-
pany needed for its annual meeting in two weeks. SEC Report 
[1939, p. 710] noted that Greenwald “thought it improbable that 
there were any irregularities other than the forgeries.” He could 
never have envisioned the troubles that were about to beset 
IHM; troubles that would eventually change the fundamental 
philosophy behind external audits.
THE NEW YORK STATE INVESTIGATION
The NYT [1938b, p. 8] reported that IHM caught Marien 
forging four other checks for an additional $1,200 during the 
time he stayed on at the mill. This forced H&D to remove him 
from the position on February 8, 1938. The CPA firm dispatched 
an unnamed replacement from the New York office to the 
Lansdale mill. In the course of familiarizing himself with the 
accounts, the new accountant asked to compare the books at the 
mill with those of the corporate offices in New York. Within a 
short period, it was clear that $2,000 in check forgeries was not 
the real problem caused by Marien. By February 10, the new ac-
countant reported to Davis, a founding partner of the CPA firm, 
that it appeared that there were large discrepancies between the 
books of IHM’s New York office and the books of the mill. Mc-
Carten [1962, p. 446] noted that, “the Homes & Davis operative 
discovered that the New York books, on which Interstate was 
paying off,8 bore only the sketchiest relation to reality.” He went 
on to write, “for almost four years Interstate had been basing 
salaries, dividends, bonuses, and general financial policy on 
balance-sheets which Raymond Marien had just made up out of 
his own head.” This revelation brought the full weight of the law 
down on both Marien and the company.
On February 16, 1938, the police arrested Marien at his 
home, an apartment in Sunnyside, Long Island, where he lived 
with his wife and three adolescent children.9 He was booked into 
the familiar confines of “The Tombs,” where he was questioned 
8 In using the verbiage “paying off,” it should be noted that McCarten was a 
journalist and not an accountant. One would presume that he meant IHM’s pay-
ment of dividends or bonuses and not illegal gambling debts.
9 McCarten [1962, p. 444], reported that Marien married a Toronto socialite 
whose wealthy father disagreed with the marriage. She stood by Marien through 
these troubles and, after he went to prison, worked as a waitress to support her 
family.
8
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by the New York State Attorney General’s Office.10 McCarten 
[1962, p. 446] wrote that Marien soon confessed to his “juggling” 
the books, stating that he was “overworked and under nervous 
strain.” The NYT [1938d, p. 2] reported that Assistant New York 
Attorney General Ambrose V. McCall told his supervisors that 
Marien “had confessed that he had exaggerated the corpora-
tion’s assets in the public balance sheets for several years.” The 
newspaper went on to write that the accountant said that he 
“had falsified the accounts on a ‘crazy impulse’ at no profit to 
himself.”11 
Even with a confession in hand, the Attorney General’s Of-
fice continued its investigation, seeking to learn if the officers of 
the mills had profited from the falsified statements. Accordingly, 
McCarten [1962] related that investigators from the Attorney 
General’s Office questioned Marien almost daily trying to under-
stand what he had done. Marien, for his part, taunted them by 
“expounding on financial theory and practice,” while admitting 
to investigators what items he had “fudged,” and explaining that 
none of the problem could be corrected without his help. As it 
turned out, his financial manipulations were actually “second-
rate” in nature. The SEC report would conclude that had some-
one at the company actually read the reports from Marien, the 
problems at the company would have been discovered, a theme 
parroted by many sources.
During all of the interrogations, Marien never varied his 
story, and he never implicated any other official at IHM. To rule 
out an insanity plea, an investigator sent Marien to Bellevue 
Psychiatric Hospital for an evaluation where he was found to 
have “superior intelligence” [NYT, 1938i, p. 13]. Marien even 
went so far as to write letters to the attorney general explaining 
how ignorant his investigators were. While in jail, Marien also 
became what modern parlance would call a “jail-house lawyer” 
by preparing writs of habeas corpus on behalf of other prisoners.
In May 1938, McCall, acting for the then New York Attorney 
General Bennet, conducted further hearings into the matter. 
The NYT [1938e, p. 33] reported that the first witness for these 
hearings was Henry I. Hann from S.D. Leidesdorf and Co., the 
firm that conducted the re-audit of the IHM. Hann testified that 
10 In the intervening six days between discovery and Marien’s arrest, the com-
pany and its auditors informed both the Curb Market and the SEC of the prob-
lems leading to the market’s trading suspension on February 15, 1938.
11 According to the NYT [1938g, p. 35], Marien was in the Tombs “on default 
of $15,000 bail.”
9
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Marien had just “added $100,000 here and $100,000 there” at 
the Lansdale mill and reported the following inflated income:
1934 1935 1936 1937
$374,966 $195,772 $409,127 $951,122
Hann’s testimony further showed the extent of the problems 
when he noted that IHM would have actually shown a loss of 
$56,799 for 1937 without Marien’s manipulations. This forced 
the officers of the corporation to return all but $90,000 of the 
$269,000 paid in bonuses since 1934. Hann testified that the 
discrepancies could easily have been found by Marien’s supervi-
sors at H&D or the officials at IHM had they done something as 
simple as comparing the central-office books with those of the 
mill. Hann ended his testimony by demonstrating that the com-
pany was still solvent despite the accounting problems.
At this revelation, it appears that the principals from the 
companies involved tried to distance themselves from the 
scandal. For example, a WSJ [1938c, p.17] article of February 
18, 1938 reported Homes, the managing partner of H&D, testi-
fied that “monthly statements made up by [Marien] were sent 
to officers of Interstate but they had not been checked against 
the company’s books or the inaccuracies would have been ap-
parent.” Next, Greenwald, IHM’s treasurer, testified that the 
company had no head bookkeeper (a modern controller) at the 
New York headquarters. Because of this odd situation, there 
was apparently no accountant on staff to compare the mill and 
corporate books. Fundamentally, Marien had kept impeccable 
books for the mill, but falsified the reports he sent to the New 
York corporate office where his manipulations would have eas-
ily been discovered if proper internal-control procedures were 
in place. Finally, the WSJ [1938b, p. 12] reported that Selig, the 
president of the IHM, testified that he had “no knowledge that 
the assets shown on the books were in excess of actualities.”
The WSJ [1938d, p. 13] from May 25, 1938 further enhanced 
the information about the fraud by reporting that IHM’s 1937 
earned-surplus account was $1,721,000, but should have been 
$223,000 without Marien’s manipulations. The actual profits of 
the company between 1934 and 1937 should have been approxi-
mately $440,000 compared with the reported $1,118,000. The in-
flated profits led to overpayment of income taxes and an excess 
dividend payout of nearly $400,000 in addition to the improper 
bonuses paid to IHM’s officials. By 1937, the manipulations had 
inflated the company’s assets by nearly $1.9 million, including 
inflated inventory of $904,000, accounts receivable of $701,000, 
10
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and cash of $234,000. This pattern of inflated assets began in 
1934 and grew as follows:
 1934 1935 1936 1937
$391,000 $496,600 $756,000 $1,900,0000
Earlier articles discussing IHM’s case failed to explain how 
Marien accomplished this financial manipulation other than 
to comment that he “wrote-up” the accounts, even though the 
primary manipulation turned out to be an understatement of 
“prime cost of sales.” The understatement eventually caused the 
higher than normal net-income figures. Using the information 
published by the WSJ [1938a, p. 11], Exhibit A below shows a 
composite balance sheet for IHM as of 1937 year-end. From the 
figures given, the assets shown on the manipulated balance sheet 
must have been in excess of $5 million, meaning that nearly 40% 
of the firm’s assets were non-existent. 
In the end, New York’s investigation left the complicated 
process of explaining the manipulations and their consequences
EXHIBIT A
Interstate Hosiery Mills
 Estimated Balance Sheet 
December 31, 1937
Developed from materials published in the Wall Street Journal  
[1938a, p. 11]
Assets Liabilities and Equity
Cash $151, 586 Accrued Taxes $30,613
Net Receivables 575,896 Notes Payable 714,500
Miscellaneous 
Receivables 
942 Sundry Liabilities/
Accrued Taxes
50,648
Inventories 1,010,177  
Sundry 37,640 Non—current Serial 
Notes Payable
80,125
Patents and Goodwill 1  
Net Plant and 
Equipment Depreciation 
and Mortgages
1,279,318 Capital Stock (par 20) 1,963,820
Deferred Charges 52,699 Surplus 266,553
Total Assets $3,108,259 Total Liabilities and 
Equity
$3,108,259
Note: There is a $2,000 error in the reported liabilities and equity items com-
pared to the reported total.
11
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to the coming investigation by the SEC. In addition, New York 
officials could neither implicate any of IHM’s officers in the 
fraud nor prove that Marien had financially benefited by his ac-
tions. All they had were the forged checks written on the First 
National Bank of Lansdale. When Marien was arraigned before 
Judge John Freshchi on forgery charges, he pled “not guilty,” 
even though he had confessed his misdeeds to both officials of 
IHM and his H&D employers [NYT, 1938f, p. 30].
THE SEC INVESTIGATION AND FINDINGS 
As the news of the problems at IHM filtered through the 
New York financial community, the New York Curb Market 
informed the company on February 16, 1938, “that they had 
suspended trading in the company’s stock pending an investiga-
tion.” The NYT [1938a, p. 42] reported that the company had 
to postpone its annual meeting scheduled for that week and 
would issue a new financial report after a new audit firm (S.D. 
Leidesdorf and Co.) had an opportunity to complete its work. In 
response to the problems at IHM reported by the NYT and the 
WSJ over the previous four months, the regional SEC office in 
New York announced hearings for June 28, 1938 to determine 
if IHM’s stock should be permanently withdrawn from registra-
tion and trading on the Curb Exchange. Officials from the SEC 
became involved due to the concern that the rapid growth in 
IHM’s stock value resulted from the company’s misrepresen-
tation of its financial condition. In addition, the SEC [1939, 
p. 711] wished to investigate if the statements in annual registra-
tion forms fairly represented the condition of the company since 
the SEC “had reason to believe the financial statements for the 
years 1934, 1935, and 1936, filed with [the] Commission…were 
false and misleading.” Finally the SEC’s investigation sought 
to determine if H&D “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, should have known,” that there were problems with 
IHM’s financial condition. 
In November 1938, a preliminary report filed by the SEC 
found that both IHM and H&D were at fault for the accounting 
irregularities. Both the company and its CPA firm challenged 
the preliminary report. On December 6, 1938, all the parties 
involved made “oral arguments” before the SEC. This later 
investigation would report a cumulative $1.6 million of total 
accounting irregularities for 1934-1936. The corresponding $1.9 
million in overstated assets reported by the WSJ [1938d, p. 13] is 
a cumulative balance-sheet figure that included amounts from 
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the unpublished 1937 IHM annual report. The SEC was not 
interested in these numbers because the company had never 
released the inflated 1937 annual report that the company cor-
rected before it became part of the fraud. McCarten, however, 
detailed the differences (Exhibit B) between Lansdale mill’s cor-
rect books and the numbers sent to New York in 1937.
EXHIBIT B
McCarten’s [1962] Published Balances
Account Title New York 
Accounts
Lansdale 
Accounts
Difference provided 
by authors in italics
Cash $386,073 $151,839 $234,234
Accounts Receivable 1,263,543 561,605 701,938
Inventory 1,840,393 936,034 904,359
Total account changes 3,490,009 1,649,478 1,840,531
 
Profits 582,541 -56,759 525,782
Total Assets $4,859,508 $3,382,558 $1,476,950
The overstated cash, accounts receivable, and inventory 
amounts in the unpublished 1937 statements mirrored those 
included in the SEC Report [1939, p. 718]. However, the inflated 
profits reported by the NYT [1938e, p. 33] do not agree with 
those reported by McCarten, and the inflated asset totals report-
ed by the WSJ [1938d, p. 12] do not agree with those reported by 
the SEC [1939]. Any attempt to reconcile the balances published 
by the different publications is impossible without the original 
documents. To make the process of the fraud even more confus-
ing, the overstated amounts, especially for cash and receivables, 
were accomplished without manipulating sales.
Brink [1939, p. 21] wrote that the cash management for 
IHM was handled outside of the reports created by Marien since 
“the Vice-President received a current report on bank balances 
in the form of entries made in a book kept by his secretary.” This 
report, and not Marien’s reports, was used to monitor IHM’s 
cash position. A comparison of the two would have shown the 
overstatement problem; however, it was a moot point due to its 
lack of financial impact. Brink [1939, p. 21] also pointed out that 
a review of the receivables and sales balances included in the 
audit report would have indicated “a relationship that could not 
have been possible under the credit terms and collection record 
of [the company].” Again, the New York and Lansdale records 
were never reconciled.
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The SEC Report [1939, p. 712] said that Marien’s manipula-
tions did not take place in the actual account books of the Lans-
dale mill. Rather, he manipulated trial balances (the previously 
mentioned balance sheets) that were sent to New York to be 
consolidated with the reports from the other mills. As it turned 
out, either H&D, IHM, or both should have found these manipu-
lations quite easily if someone had bothered to compare them 
with source documents. The SEC, though, did not seem too con-
cerned with these overall problems because it concentrated on 
manipulation of inventories and the understated cost of goods 
sold, which actually were the culprits in inflating IHM’s  profits. 
In the final analysis, the SEC probably felt that the inflated 
income, and its corresponding earnings per share number, did 
more to help boost the stock price of the firm than the inflated 
assets. 
According to McCarten, Marien deflated the cost of goods 
sold by manipulating what the SEC called the “prime cost of 
sales.” In this case, he had to falsify raw-silk contracts and prices 
from the commission knitters and throwsters (producers and ex-
porters of raw silk) with whom IHM dealt. The SEC noted that 
during the audit season, Marien supervised approximately 20 
audit staff from the CPA firm. Each staff member was respon-
sible for different parts of the ledger, with one conducting an 
audit of cash and another the confirmation of receivables while 
part of the staff dealt with inventories. Marien, however, con-
ducted the valuation of the raw-materials inventory. This valu-
ation supposedly included reviewed market reports for raw silk 
which he ultimately changed to have the effect of understating 
the cost of goods sold or, as IHM titled it, “prime cost of sales.” 
The SEC Report [1939, p. 714] then mentioned that Phillips, the 
partner on the engagement, testified that he specifically accepted 
Marien’s valuation of raw materials because he was not familiar 
with the silk market. 
The overstatement of the principal balance-sheet accounts 
was reported by the SEC [1939, p. 708] and is shown in Exhibit 
C, along with author-developed analytics to help determine the 
process of the fraud and its possible early discovery. Exhibit 
C shows that the overstatement of assets in “principal balance 
sheet accounts,” in each year under scrutiny closely follows 
the gross profit overstatement. The SEC Report [1939, p. 708] 
 indicated that it appeared Marien was increasing the asset ac-
counts like inventory and decreasing the cost of goods sold, 
resulting in overstated assets and an overstated earned-surplus 
account.
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There were internal measurements besides the financial 
statements that should have alerted management to problems at 
Lansdale. First, as reported by the SEC, the sales-to-receivables 
ratio increased during the three years (1934-1936). Second, in-
ventory turnover should have immediately raised some concerns 
because the increased inventories compared to cost of goods 
sold should have alerted officials to possible over-production 
problems. Finally, the gross-profit ratio should have been sus-
pect as well. The corrected gross-profit ratio is the same for 
1934 and 1935, and it can be assumed that the ratio would not 
have been that much different in 1933. Anybody making this 
simple calculation would have noticed that the ratio had almost 
doubled from one year to the next, then dropping sharply from 
1934 to 1935, and rebounding in 1936. Based on the SEC report, 
IHM priced its products conservatively.
In the end, discovery of Marien‘s forged checks and sub-
sequent disclosure of accounting irregularities apparently 
 occurred by accident and not through the proactive mechanisms 
of internal control, supervision, and proper segregation of du-
ties. Scheduled supervisory visits to the mill and reconciling ac-
count balances at corporate headquarters with account balances 
at the mill would have gone a long way to mitigate the troubles 
caused by Marien. But again, apparently nobody checked. Such 
a lack of planning and supervision would be at the heart of the 
SEC’s criticisms of the CPA firm.
THE SEC FINDINGS AND RULING
Supervision: On March 18, 1939, the SEC published a report 
titled In the Matter of Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc. The report 
brought the supervision of Raymond Marien (who had never tes-
tified) under close scrutiny. Phillips testified that he had acted as 
both Marien’s supervisor and work-paper reviewer on the IHM 
audit until 1931. Thereafter, Marien conducted the work with-
out any supervision and only cursory review by Phillips, who 
“was more concerned with the completion of all of the items on 
the audit program.” He testified that he did this by “thumbing 
through confirmations” and reviewing schedules that would tie 
to later corporate consolidations. 
Phillips also said that he did not review the auditor’s “sum-
mary mill cost sheets.” A review of these documents over a 
period would have shown a history of “prime cost ratios”12 that 
12 The ratio is calculated by dividing the prime cost of sales (in this case, raw 
silk) by the mill’s related sales. 
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could be compared to the reported figures, similar to a modern 
analytical review of gross-margin percentages. Then, a devia-
tion from the historical data should have given Phillips pause to 
think and react to a possible problem (see Exhibit C). According 
to the SEC, its investigation revealed that profits were overstated 
principally by understating “prime cost of sales” (modern cost of 
goods sold) in the profit-and-loss statements. Essentially, it ap-
pears that Marien purposely overstated the ending raw-materials 
inventories. This error corresponded to the understatement of 
cost of goods sold. How and why he did this is still unclear, but 
the process can be seen in the following example13:
Beginning 
Inventory
Add 
Purchases
Available 
Inventory
Less 
Ending 
Inventory
Cost of 
Goods 
sold
(Prime 
Costs) Sales
Gross 
Profit
Prime 
Cost 
Ratio
Gross 
Profit %
Correct 25,000 225,000 250,000 20,000 230,000 700,000 470,000 .3285 67%
Overstated 25,000 225,000 250,000 30,000 220,000 700,000 480,000 .3143 69%
Assuming all other costs of manufacturing (e.g., direct la-
bor and various overhead accounts) were not manipulated, the 
overstated ending inventory decreased cost of goods sold and 
increased gross profit. This in turn created a downward trend in 
the prime-cost-of-sales-to-sales ratio and increased (or overstat-
ed) gross profits. This was the prime reason for the suspension 
of trading privileges at the New York Curb Market.14 
Even though Phillips did not review the mill reports, the 
trial examiners, Adrian Humphrey and Pierce Bradley, dis-
missed this analytic review process as a means of identifying the 
inventory problems because Marien’s manipulations of the trial 
balances hid any problem from prying eyes.15 Though Philips 
tacitly seemed to be exonerated in this area, in light of the true 
inventory balances at the mill as reported by production man-
ager Charles Frankel [SEC, 1939, p. 718], the upward trend in 
Marien’s reported inventory balances and decreasing inventory 
13 The manipulation of inventories was obviously intentional; an unintention-
al inventory error is self-correcting in the next accounting period providing no 
other errors occur. 
14 The SEC seems to say that the original investigation by New York State 
either ignored the prime-cost-ratio issue or overlooked its importance. The SEC 
mentioned the ratio data should have been put into evidence even though, in a 
contradictory comment, “there was nothing in the falsified profit figures them-
selves which would have aroused suspicion.” 
15 The fraud could have been identified earlier if the ratios had been signifi-
cantly different from historical trends, but Marien just seemed to make small 
changes over time. 
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turnover accompanied by an increase in accounts-receivable 
turnover should have necessitated an investigation and recon-
ciliation with actual inventories. This very likely would have 
uncovered Marien’s deceit sooner rather than later. Marien may 
have prolonged this deceit by creating some manipulations that 
gave the opposite effect of actually widening the ratios, making 
it appear that inventories were actually increasing on an histori-
cal basis. How he did this was not explained.
The SEC examiners did not, however, fully exonerate 
Phillips from negligence because in his lack of extensive work-
paper review, he failed to notice that the trial balance, which is 
included as part of any set of work-papers, had obviously been 
manipulated with sheets replaced and doctored. Here the fraud 
should have been apparent to both Phillips and IHM officials 
because Marien did not bother to renumber the papers. Simply 
put, the trial-balance pages that were numbered 1 of 7, or 2 of 7, 
etc. were actually eight pages with Marien’s handwriting on the 
false page along with an incorrect footing. The expert witnesses 
brought in by the SEC [1939, p. 715] to review H&D’s practices 
actually seemed to support Phillips’ work saying it was:
…generally sufficient for a reviewer to question the ac-
countant in charge of an audit as to anything unclear 
or unusual, accepting without check or verifications an-
swers which appear to be reasonable; he does not neces-
sarily examine the trial balance or other working papers 
in detail; he ascertained the existence of confirmations, 
but need not attempt to relate the amounts confirmed 
to the figures in the report he is reviewing.
The SEC examiners took exception with these practices, 
which were apparently quite prevalent within the auditing pro-
fession, and remonstrated that they were insufficient and “re-
quired thorough revision.” The SEC Report [1939, p. 716] then 
went on to say that this type of partner or supervisory review 
should first ensure “the integration of the original work papers 
with the financial statements and second a searching analysis of 
the ultimate facts developed in the course of the actual audit.” In 
a rather lengthy discussion of the lack of supervision by H&D, 
the trial examiner succinctly pointed out that a work-paper re-
view that was more than just perfunctory in nature would have 
“exposed the irregularities in this case.”
Supervision of the staff would become a hallmark of the 
work of CPAs with the introduction of Generally Accepted 
 Auditing Standards by the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
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in 1948. In particular, the standards of field work highlighted 
that “work is to be adequately planned and any assistants are to 
be properly supervised” [Holmes, 1951, p. 4]. Arens and Beasley 
[2003, p. 32] write that, “supervision is essential in auditing 
because a considerable portion of the field work is done by less 
experienced staff members.” In the case of H&D, the formal 
audit program used by the company made it clear that it had 
planned its audit of IHM well, but that the lack of supervision, 
due to  either complacency or laziness, had caused many of the 
problems for the firm. Marien’s propensity for lies and deception 
probably exacerbated those problems.
In the end, the SEC [1939, p. 715] failed to find that the 
review made by Phillips, customary at H&D, “was less extensive 
than that ordinarily made by accounting firms.” William Werntz 
[1939, p. 1], the chief accountant of the SEC, commented on 
the IHM and McKesson & Robbins cases as “evidence of the 
inadequacies in the procedures and practices in auditing.” He 
continued in his speech before the Ohio Society of CPAs on Sep-
tember 7, 1939, commenting that the SEC Report “…indicated 
it was satisfied that an adequate review would have exposed the 
irregularities and if the views of the registrant’s expert witnesses 
were to be accepted as to the usual practice followed by [CPAs], 
in reviewing the work of those responsible for the opinion that 
the practice requires thorough revision.” An internal peer review 
similar to that used in modern audit firms may have found the 
problem of the lack of supervision on the IHM audit well before 
the problems came to light.16
Independence: Over and above the falsified documents, the 
trial examiners went on to question whether H&D had actually 
completed an “independent audit.” The SEC went on to criticize 
the process of the “mill auditors” completion and “certification” 
of the “monthly detailed audit.” It felt that these reports were 
not audited in the “true sense of the word,” and that H&D were 
false in designating the monthly reports as audited. The SEC 
Report [1939, p. 717] stated that the “certified reports could not 
accurately be described as an independent audit for the amaz-
ing extent Marien had taken upon himself in the function of 
bookkeeping as well as auditing for Interstate.” As discussed 
previously, the officials of both companies never saw any conflict
 
16 The SEC [1949, pp. 12-13] noted that problems of lack of supervision not 
only have to be addressed for junior employees, but for audit partners as well. 
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between Marien’s dual responsibilities as auditor and bookkeep-
ing supervisor. Testimony stressed that the standard journal of 
the mill (in actuality, the mill’s ledger) was in Marien’s posses-
sion, and that he made entries in it even though officials of the 
CPA firm said this was against company policy. Davis, partner in 
the firm, testified, “if the accountant is permitted to do original 
work, the purpose of the audit is lost” [SEC, 1939, p. 717].
The SEC’s comments expanded a ruling from a 1937 ASR 
that an accountant cannot be deemed independent if he is an of-
ficer or director of the registrant or holds a significant financial 
interest [SEC, 1976, p. 1]. By 1950, Rule 13 of the AICPA’s rules 
of professional conduct reiterated this concept [Holmes, 1951, 
p. 35]. Almost 60 years later, Section 210 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act bolstered independence rules by banning CPAs from audit-
ing books that they helped prepare or accounting systems that 
they either designed or helped install.
In addition to the standard journal, Marien, at the request 
of IHM officials, also kept a “private ledger” that included ac-
counts that management wanted kept secret from its employees. 
The SEC did not seem to think this was an inappropriate course 
of action, probably because Lansdale was a unionized mill. The 
problem was that Marien had control over these records with 
their contents (probably additional income), bypassing the in-
come statement and posted directly to surplus after the closing 
of the mill’s regular books. Though H&D apparently did not 
know that Marien was completing original write-up work, it was 
obvious that IHM officials approved of this arrangement. Such 
work by Marien, in the opinion of the SEC, made the books of 
the Lansdale mill unaudited. The SEC [1939, p. 717] rebuked 
the practice by reporting, “Marien’s unchecked control not only 
renders the Homes & Davis’ [audit] certificates false as to scope 
of the audit made, but also imposes upon Interstate consider-
able responsibility for Marien’s misdeeds.” The independence 
issues highlighted in the IHM case were used by the SEC [1972] 
in a monograph to explain the guidelines and examples of situa-
tions involving the independence of accountants.
Management Responsibility: The findings against H&D did not 
let the officials of IHM off the proverbial hook because the SEC 
took exception with its review and control practices as well. 
For example, reports coming from Frankel, the Lansdale mill’s 
cost accountant, showed a different cost-per-dozen hose manu-
factured than Marien’s reports. These discrepancies were never 
investigated by the company. The SEC [1939, p. 719] concluded 
20
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that the understatement of cost by the H&D accountant resulted 
in an “overstatement of the average gross profit per dozen on 
sales amounting to about 44 percent in the annual report for 
1936 and 150 percent for the first six months of 1937.” Brink 
[1939, p. 21] commented that the realization (production) 
schedules and related orders “furnished to the officers should 
have proved a basis for detecting the overstatements.”
Greenwald, who actually made the purchases of silk for the 
company, should have also seen a “red flag” had he compared 
his record of silk prices with Marien’s reports. These reports 
would also have been identified as false had there been a com-
parison of monthly cash and receivables reports generated in 
New York with those coming from Landsdale. In the SEC’s 
[1939, p. 719] opinion, “if management had made any effort at 
all to check the information in the H&D reports against that fur-
nished by their own employees, Marien’s inventions would have 
been discovered as soon as they began.” In the end, the SEC 
found that the officers of IHM hardly read Marien’s reports, let 
alone made any comparisons with internally generated figures; 
yet, they were responsible for the ultimate content.17 In a lengthy 
explanation of its judgment, the SEC [1939, p. 721] concluded 
that:
…the fundamental and primary responsibility for the 
accuracy of the information filed with the Commission 
and disseminated among investors rests upon manage-
ment. Management does not discharge its obligations in 
this respect by the employment of independent public 
accountants, however reputable.18 …In our opinion 
the conduct of Interstate’s Management in respect of 
information which was to be the basis of reports sub-
mitted to the New York Curb Market, stockholders and 
the Commission indicated a complete abdication of re-
sponsibility.…We conclude that the officers of Interstate 
were at fault in failing to discover the falsification of the 
financial statements filed with the Commission.19
17 The ruling did not change auditors’ relationships to third-party liability de-
veloped in Ultramares Corp v. Touche. According to the NYT [1939a, p. 30], the 
only reported lawsuit stemming from Marien’s fraud came from Aaron J.Funk, 
whose suit was over the excess bonuses that the officers eventually paid back. 
18 In June 1947, the SEC’s ASR #62 used this verbiage to explain that indepen-
dent CPAs should be careful in certifying “summary earnings tables” and other 
condensed financial-reporting devices. 
19 Montgomery [1949 p. 7] used the same quote to highlight management’s 
responsibility for financial reporting. The quote showed the importance of the 
IHM case after its adjudication. However, by the next edition [Montgomery, 1957, 
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The responsibility of the accounting reports would be a 
point of contention for many years. In 1947, the SEC [ASR #62, 
p. 3] comments that the corollary to the IHM rulings is that, 
“the accountant’s certificates are required not as a substitute 
for management’s accounting of its stewardship but as a check 
of that accounting.” In the mid-1980s, the AICPA, in an effort 
to limit its members’ liability, included verbiage to this effect in 
its model audit report presented in SAS #58, Reports on Audited 
Financial Statements. In a more definitive manner, Title III of 
Sarbanes-Oxley reiterated the findings of this long-forgotten 
panel and made certain that corporate officials were formally 
responsible for the financial reports of the company under the 
threat of jail and fines.
The SEC Ruling: The general purpose of the SEC hearings origi-
nally was to determine if the suspension of IHM from trading 
on the Curb Exchange should be made permanent, resulting in 
formal de-listing and rescission of its right to trade shares of 
stock. In this part of the ruling, the SEC found that the officers 
of the corporation were negligent in their duties but not the 
CPA firm. The SEC, however, also found that in the year since 
the company had revealed its problems to the Curb Market, the 
company had made a number of changes to mitigate any future 
problems. For example, IHM’s prompt notification of the Curb 
Exchange and the SEC allowed for a re-audit of the company’s 
books with amendments filed on a timely basis. This seemed 
to convince the SEC that there was no intent of wrongdoing on 
the part of the officers of the corporation. Second, there was the 
prompt return of excess bonuses paid to the corporate officers. 
This showed that they were concerned with the institutional in-
tegrity of the company. Next, the company employed a corporate 
controller with responsibility over all three mills, allaying any 
SEC fears that this type of manipulation would happen again. 
Finally, the company made employment contracts more flexible 
as to bonuses as well as the removal of officers for cause. In the 
end, the SEC [1939, p. 721] ordered that the “registration of the 
common stock of Interstate Hosiery Mills on the New York Curb 
Exchange shall not be suspended or withdrawn.” 
An editorial by John L. Carey [1939, pp. 257-258] in the 
Journal of Accountancy highlighted the importance of the SEC’s 
p. 60], the reference had been dropped and relegated to a paraphrase that read: 
“…in a well publicized decision…management has the fundamental and primary 
responsibility for the accuracy of the financial statements.” 
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finding in this matter. Carey emphasized the SEC’s supervision 
position, but warned that the ruling does not “relieve the inde-
pendent auditor of full responsibility for the exercise of reason-
able care and diligence in making his check upon management’s 
accounting.” He goes on to write that the volume of material is 
too great for one person to scrutinize, and that the acts of sub-
ordinates are their responsibility, leading to a duty of “reviewing 
adequately the work of staff assistance as to satisfy themselves 
of its sufficiency.” Carey finished by indicating that the IHM 
case may be a “freak one,” but it is the partner’s duty “to  satisfy 
his own mind as to the representations of his assistants are 
sound and reasonable, and that they are based on sufficiently 
extensive inquiry and investigation.” These comments were pub-
lished before the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) issued 
standards of fieldwork, supervision, and evidential matter in the 
late 1940s. 
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS 
The issuance of the SEC Report recommending the rein-
statement of IHM’s trading privileges on the Curb Exchange 
effectively ended the Raymond Marien fiasco. The WSJ [1939, 
p. 2] reported that the Exchange allowed the trading of IHM’s 
stock at 1:00 p.m. on March 24, 1939. For their part, IHM’s of-
ficials were required to return the remaining $90,000 in bonuses 
paid to them from 1934-1936 even though this represented earn-
ings from corrected financial statements [NYT, 1939a, p. 30]. 
Despite all the evidence from the hearings, this article alluded to 
the continuing suspicion in public circles and that IHM’s man-
agers would be dogged by rumors that they had put Marien up 
to the task of “juggling” the books. In fact, the issues surround-
ing IHM’s difficulties would surface again as the McKesson & 
Robbins fraud unfolded in late 1938. At that time, the president 
of the New York Society of CPAs wrote a letter to the McKesson 
inquiry committee stating that “recent investigations into such 
[accounting problems] like Interstate Hosiery Company, have 
revealed certain fundamental weaknesses into the preparation 
of financial statements of large corporations” [NYT, 1938j, p. 4]. 
Within a few years, the Marien affair faded from the public 
eye, and the future of IHM began to brighten. For example, the 
1939 financials showed profits of $2.27 per share compared with 
$2.15 in 1938 [NYT, 1940, p. 31]. Assets, however, were just $1.9 
million after the reduction forced by the revelation that nearly 
five million dollars in inflated assets were reported in 1937. 
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IHM, however, would soon face some unusual problems as the 
relations between Japan and the U.S. deteriorated. In July 1941, 
President Roosevelt declared a de facto embargo on purchases 
from Japan which produced 85% of the world’s silk at the time. 
The ban, however, was not on the importation of Japanese 
 products directly, but rather on the transfers of U.S. hard cur-
rency to that country. This forced all silk hosiery manufactures 
to begin using more synthetic fibers like nylon. 
Even with this problem, the company successfully survived 
the transition to the war years, posting $4.723 per share earn-
ings in 1941 that allowed a restructuring and a repurchase of 
$500,000 of outstanding shares from the market [NYT, 1942, 
p. 29]. By 1943, however, the fortunes had turned as the NYT 
[1943, p. 26] reported the sale of the Bloomfield, New Jersey 
plant in January of that year. This event, along with a reported 
65% drop in earnings per share in 1942 due to a limited produc-
tion of women’s fine hosiery because of wartime silk shortages, 
began the slow decline of IHM. 
In 1945, the company voluntarily ceased trading on the 
Curb Exchange [NYT, 1945, p. 28], and by the early 1950s,  nylon 
shortages in the industry due to the Korean conflict left the 
company financially weak. In November 1953, IHM accepted a 
contract to sell all of its operating assets to Green Cove Hosiery 
Corporation, a subsidiary of Burlington Mills. According to 
Greenwald v. Commissioner, Green Cove agreed to purchase “all 
of Interstate’s operating assets, real property, inventories, ac-
counts receivable, leases, name, customer lists, goodwill.” In the 
end, IHM’s name was changed to I.L.H. Corporation, and the 
textile company was converted to an investment company. 
What happened to Raymond Marien during this period? 
The NYT [1939b, p. 37] reported on October 26, 1938 that Ray-
mond Marien reversed his plea and admitted guilt to the charge 
of “attempted forgery.” The court sentenced Marien to two and 
one-half years in prison at the Ossining Correctional Institute 
(Sing Sing) on November 4, 1938. The NYT further reported that 
he received this rather harsh sentence because it was his second 
offense for the same crime. This time he could not claim it was 
to help his family. The article went on to mention that Marien’s 
sentence for attempted forgery grew “out of his mysterious falsi-
fication of accounts and inventories of the hosiery concern.” 
Other than a brief mention in the litigation entitled In­
terstate Hosiery Mills v The First National Bank of Lansdale, 
Marien’s trail stops with the 1939 McCarten article. In this case, 
IHM sued the bank to recover the losses incurred by the com-
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pany from the forged checks passed by “Ray Marien” and paid 
by the bank. The 1940 case suggested that Marien was still in 
prison for passing the checks at a New York bank.20 McCarten 
[1962, p. 447] wrote that to the end, Marien maintained his de-
fense that he was overworked and that stress made him falsify 
the records. However, the author mused that “overwork might 
more reasonably be accepted as the result rather than the cause 
of Marien’s hocus-pocus,” because “the work involved was just 
about five times what it would have been had he been keeping 
honest records.” Did the long “commute” to the job and days 
away from an apparently normal and loving family life exasper-
ate this situation? The answer is unknown; however, McCarten 
[1962, p. 447] felt he could easily identify Marien’s motivation 
for the check forgeries as “a string of bad luck at the horse 
track.” 
Though the name of Raymond Marien is probably unknown 
to most accountants, and his motivations for the fraud may 
never be known, its result would have far-reaching effects on 
the conduct of audits that have lasted into the 21st century. 
The  auditing profession fundamentally changed its philosophy 
for the planning and control of audits. The related principles of 
 auditor independence, supervision, and management respon-
sibility for the accounting records can be traced to Marien’s 
actions in much the same way as the more famous 1938 McKes-
son & Robbins case changed the procedural conduct of audits to 
confirm inventories and accounts receivable. To reiterate Felker 
[2003, p. 45], this research pointed out that the actions of the 
people in the IHM case “reflect the origins [of the SEC’s] long-
standing views on the role of and responsibilities of executives 
and auditors.”
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